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P R E S E N T A T I O N    N O T E S  &  H A N D – O U T  
 
Jurisdiction and Responsibility:  




The following are presentation notes that were handed out to participants at the 2008 
Constitutional Cases conference: 
 
It is useful to begin with a quotation that situates the current Charter territorial application discussion 
within the understanding of the Canadian criminal law jurisdiction set out in the 1985 landmark  Libman 
case by La Forest J. for the Court: 
 
67. This country has a legitimate interest in prosecuting persons for activities that take place 
abroad but have an unlawful consequence here, (as in Peters, for example). Indeed, from an 
early period the English courts have recognized such an interest in other countries.. The 
protection of the public in this country is widely acknowledged to be a legitimate purpose of 
criminal law, and one moreover that another nation could not easily say offended the 
dictates of comity. 
 
68. But the courts did not confine themselves to taking jurisdiction over transnational 
offences whose impact was felt within the country. As early as 1883…they also took 
jurisdiction in cases where the victim and hence the impact was abroad. In the early cases, 
there was a tendency to justify this in terms of the links that connected the act to the 
jurisdiction. In doing so they foreshadowed modern academic writing on the subject, which 
points out that a similar approach prevails in both public and private international law… 
 
71. ….For in considering that question we must, in my view, take into account all relevant 
facts that take place in Canada that may legitimately give this country an interest in 
prosecuting the offence. One must then consider whether there is anything in those facts 
that offends international comity. 
 
72. …. Apart from this, though the criminal law is undoubtedly intended for the protection 
of the public, it does not do so solely by the simple expedient of directly protecting the 
public from harm. Rather, in conformity with its major purpose, it attempts to underline the 
fundamental values of our society.. It would be a sad commentary on our law if it was 
limited to underlining society's values by the prosecution of minor offenders while 
permitting more seasoned practitioners to operate on a world-wide scale from a Canadian 
base by the simple manipulation of a technicality of the law's own making. What would be 
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underlined in the public's mind by allowing criminals to go free simply because their 
operations have grown to international proportions, I shall not attempt to expound. 
 
74.   …..As it is put by modern academics, it is sufficient that there be a "real and substantial 
link" between an offence and this country, a test well-known in public and private 
international law… 
 
76. Just what may constitute a real and substantial link in a particular case, I need not 
explore. There were ample links here. The outer limits of the test may, however, well be 
coterminous with the requirements of international comity. 
 
77. …Since [the late 19th century] means of communications have proliferated at an 
accelerating pace and the common interests of states have grown proportionately. Under 
these circumstances, the notion of comity, which means no more nor less than "kindly and 
considerate behaviour towards others", has also evolved. How considerate is it of the 
interests of the United States in this case to permit criminals based in this country to prey on 
its citizens? How does it conform to its interests or to ours for us to permit such activities 
when law enforcement agencies in both countries have developed cooperative schemes to 
prevent and prosecute those engaged in such activities? To ask these questions is to answer 
them. …I also agree with the sentiments expressed by Lord Salmon in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Doot, supra, that we should not be indifferent to the protection of the public in 
other countries. In a shrinking world, we are all our brother's keepers. In the criminal arena 
this is underlined by the international 
cooperative schemes that have been developed among national law enforcement bodies. 
 
78. ….I see nothing in the requirements of international comity that would dictate that this 
country refrain from exercising its jurisdiction. 
 
The protective function of the Charter in relation at the very least to the conduct of Canadian government 
actors abroad is directly analogous, from a first-principles and systemic-values perspective, to the 
philosophy of the SCC expressed almost 25 years ago with respect to the protective function of the 




Khadr, 2008, SCC (unanimous) – CSIS interviews/interrogation as participation in US 
Guantánamo process when they handed over the results to US authorities: CHARTER APPLIES 
+ BREACH OF CHARTER 
 
• Preliminary: interpretation of Khadr inextricably tied to Amnesty case decided subsequently by 
FCA, but I will first comment briefly on Khadr (and on its understanding of Hape) before moving 
to the interpretations/applications by the FCA in Amnesty of the Khadr case 
• Hape’s overruling of Cook’s “error” in interpreting s.32(1) of Charter to apply to conduct of 
Canadian government personnel abroad because Parliamentary “authority” is a prior question; 
because the law pertaining to police investigation is assimilated to being nothing but enforcement 
jurisdiction (versus prescriptive and/or adjudicative jurisdiction), and because PIL is found to 
allow for enforcement only by the territorial state (unless that state consents to another state’s 
enforcement activities), then ipso facto the Charter cannot apply because (interpreted in light of this 
understanding of PIL jurisdictional principles) Parliament does not have the power to “enforce” 
its laws in another state 
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• In Hape, the SCC majority misunderstands the line between enforcement jurisdiction and 
prescriptive as well as related adjudicative jurisdiction. 
• However, in Khadr, the Hape understanding of the territorial scope of application of the Charter in 
relation to some sort of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) exception leads to the basic 
finding in Khadr that the Charter both applies and has been breached; disclosure of documents is 
ordered. 
• Note the role in Khadr of USSC judgments on illegalities in Guantánamo process in relation to 
IHRL findings. 
• Relationship between violation of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and (a) applicability 
of Charter and/versus (b) limitation on comity rationale for not applying otherwise-applicable 
Canadian law 
• Charter application to evidence produced through rights violations: so far, at SCC level, this is the 
only context, but the Hape and Khadr IHRL reasoning not so limited > on to the FCA in Amnesty.  
 
Amnesty International and BCCLA v. Chief of Defence Staff et al, FCA, 2008 (unanimous) – 
transfer of prisoners by Canadian military to Afghan authorities with risk of torture or other 
abuse after handover: CHARTER DOES NOT APPLY (THUS, NO BREACH OF CHARTER) 
 
• Two questions: 1. Does Charter apply? 2. If not, does it nevertheless apply because of a claimed 
Hape IHRL exception? Unhelpfully, the FCA deals with the questions in reverse order. 
• Interpretation of Charter applicability based on Hape > The FCA appears to reject Hape reasoning 
of Charter applicability as being able to arise despite initial non-applicability of the Charter; the 
FCA appears to view consent to application of foreign law (i.e. consent by Afghanistan to 
application of Charter of Rights to Canadian military conduct) as the only exception to Charter 
non-applicability abroad. 
• Even then, the FCA gets Afghanistan “consent” badly wrong on the facts by assuming 
application of Canadian law to Canadian personnel does not cover the case at hand 
• Also, the FCA simply misreads Khadr when FCA says Hape + Khadr does not result in application 
of Charter in the event of the IHRL exception being triggered. 
• Implicitly, the FCA sees the existence of the USSC cases as dispositive to SCC reasoning in Khadr 
versus seeing the USSC case as simply the SCC’s convenient proxy for proof and establishment of 
IHRL violations. 
• The FCA invokes the Bankovic/ECHR interpretion on effective control over the person almost as 
if some sort of direct precedent for Canada and (a) as if International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) does not exist (e.g. 1981 De Casariego v Uruguay and Lopez Burgos v 
Uruguay, two longstanding UN Human Rights Committee cases; 2004 General Comment on 
ICCPR 2(1)) and (b) as if that case has not been widely criticized as tortured reasoning and veiled 
political deference by the ECtHR. 
• It is ironic how the FCA continually asserts how Canada and Afghanistan agreed that 
international law was the common denominator in terms of being the law applicable to conduct 
by their officials (soldiers, police, etcetera) but fails to grasp why this should only reinforce the 
argument that Canadian courts applying IHRL (including overlapping International Humanitarian 
Law – IHL – or International Criminal Law – ICL) is not an affront to traditional comity in 
Canada-Afghanistan relations.   At the very least, from even a traditional comity-shaped  
sensitivity (however misguided the traditional understanding may be), the FCA could have viewed 
these legal facts on the Canada-Afghanistan relationship in a way similar to how the SCC 
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referenced USSC decisions in Khadr as the factor that made it easier for SCC to apply the Hape 
IHRL exception. 
• There is a complete lack of interpretive recourse by the FCA to Public International Law 
principles of attribution and state responsibility in relation to other states’ acts in the law of state 
responsibility (2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility > General Assembly of the UN) or to 
parallel legal developments on the law related to aiding and abetting in ICL. 
• One close-to-the-surface subtext in the FCA judgment is a citizens (Khadr) versus foreigners 
(Amnesty) dichotomy; returning to the SCC Libman case and its ethos, this FCA discourse gets the 
legal and moral community all wrong. 
• Is territoriality of the disclosure order in Khadr relevant, sub-textually or in relation to 
understanding the case’s force for the future? 
 
Back to Hape, 2007 (Lebel J. for a majority of 5) – RCMP investigation in Turks & Caicos and 
issue of lack of warrants according to Canadian Charter standards: NO APPLICATION OF 
CHARTER (THUS, NO BREACH OF CHARTER) + NO SEPARATE BREACH OF 
CHARTER IN TRIAL PROCESS 
 
• Note again that the FCA in Amnesty was clearly wrong at the basic level as to what the SCC said 
in Hape, and then in Khadr. 
• At same time, the FCA implicitly picks up on (a) the analytical incoherence of Hape on Charter 
applicability being triggered only if IHRL violations occur in Hape-like police investigation 
circumstances and (b) the SCC’s (Lebel J.’s) misunderstanding of these kind of investigation cases 
as all and only about enforcement jurisdiction versus prescriptive jurisdiction (the latter dealing 
with the scope of application of Canadian law for purposes of consequences in Canadian legal 
system). 
• There needs to be a return to the sophistication of Cook on the jurisdiction and power of a state 
to apply its own laws to generate legal effects in its own legal system subject to an analysis of 
whether this represents an undue intrusion in a foreign legal system.  There needs as well to be a 
return to the ethos and big picture understandings of moral responsibility found in the LaForest J. 
judgment (for the Court) in Libman. 
• Note in Hape LeBel J.’s own admonition to Binnie J. about letting law evolve as the Court learns 
and is faced with new situations. This collegial lecture should probably apply to Hape itself, 
although there is the ever-present danger that a new SCC configuration could use the analytical 
incoherence of Hape as a reason to back off of the IHRL reference point entirely.  
• A final observation with respect to the line of jurisprudence on extraterritoriality and the Charter 
from Terry, Harrer, and Cook through to Hape, Khadr and Amnesty: the federal Department of 
Justice can be viewed as a repeat player in the same way we think of insurance companies and 
other powerful litigants as repeat players.  The repeat player advantage is especially reinforced 
when intervenor status is denied by the FCA to the U of T Faculty of Law’s IHRL Clinic based 
on it being characterized by the FCA motions judge as essentially a law firm with ‘only’ a 
“jurisprudential” interest in conformity of Canadian law with IHRL. 
• The repeat player advantage is arguably also reinforced by the ongoing poverty of legal education 
in Canada and corresponding professional and judicial understanding of foundational principles, 
processes, sources, and institutions of public international law (not to mention the related 
structure and principles of private international law / conflict of laws). 
 
